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The brain's representation of the body can be extended to include objects that are not originally part of
the body. Various studies have found both extremely rapid extensions that occur as soon as an object is
held, as well as extremely slow extensions that require weeks of training. Due to species and
methodological differences, it is unclear whether the studies were probing different representations,
or revealing multiple aspects of the same representation. Here, we present evidence that objects (cotton
balls) held by a tool (chopsticks) are rapidly integrated into the body representation, as indexed by fading
of the cotton balls (or ‘second-order extensions’) from a positive afterimage. Skillfulness with chopsticks
was predictive of more rapid integration of the second-order cotton balls held by this tool. We also found
that extensive training over a period of weeks augmented the level of integration. Together, our ﬁndings
demonstrate integration of second-order objects held by tools, and reveal that the body representation
probed by positive afterimages is subject to both rapid and slow processes of adaptive change.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-SA
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Imagine a skillful tennis player immersed in a heated match
requiring his upmost capacity and focus. For an external observer,
the tennis player is typically considered an independent actor and
cause of the events he initiates within his surrounding environ-
ment. But in the tennis-player's mental experience, his body, the
racket and even the ball can be felt as part of his sensory and
intentional self. As the ball approaches, his thoughts are less likely
to be on the desired trajectory of his arm, than on the trajectory of
the racket head. When the racket makes contact with the ball, the
feeling of impact is perceived not at the tactile sensors in his hand,
but in the racket head itself. At high levels of skill and concentra-
tion, even the racket may become secondary in his experience, all
thoughts becoming based on the ball and its desired trajectory.
This ability for conscious awareness to be focused on the ball
requires that the intermediate effectors (muscles, joints, racket) be
integrated into a subconscious, automatically processed model.
This model must be capable of tracking the current states of the
effectors, and of back-calculating conscious goals into basic motor
commands.
The original positing of a model representing the body came
from studies of neurological patients by Head and Holmes (1911).
Based on observed deﬁcits in postural awareness and tactile
localization, they proposed that the normally functioning brain
has two types of bodily representations. First there is the body
image, a conscious representation that is the subject of our
thoughts and perceptual judgments. Second, there is the body
schema, an unconscious framework that automatically integrates
posture, proprioceptive input and action goals into a common
spatial frame.
The body image is believed to be a multisensory representation
of the body that integrates stored knowledge, and by subserving
mainly perceptual purposes it is subject to bodily illusions
(Kammers, Kootker, Hogendoorn, & Dijkerman, 2010). For exam-
ple, vibrations applied to a tendon causing the sensation of that
tendon stretching will result in the perceptual experience of the
corresponding limb being moved (Goodwin, McCloskey, &
Matthews, 1972). Another manipulation of the body image is
demonstrated by the ‘rubber hand illusion'. Here, sensory conﬂict
is induced by simultaneous stroking of the own (unseen) hand and
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a visible rubber hand, resulting in an experience of tactile sensa-
tions occurring at the rubber hand (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998).
The body schema, on the other hand, is described as an
unconscious representation that subserves action rather than
perception. Head and Holmes proposed that this schema does
not exclusively code for the physical body, but is capable of
extending to objects that are needed to support skilled actions
or smooth movement through the environment. Thus, the body
schema would need to include tools, or even a large feather in
one's hat, in order to support one's actions or avoid collisions.
Though generally believed to be highly robust, also this motoric
body representation is not entirely immune to bodily illusions. For
example, after inducing the rubber hand illusion, the grip aperture
of a real hand was found to mimic that of a rubber hand (Kammers
et al., 2010).
Since the early work of Head and Holmes, people largely agree
on the existence of multiple body representations, though their
exact number and deﬁnition is still a matter of debate (Cardinali
et al., 2009, 2012; de Vignemont, 2010; Kammers, et al., 2010).
Evidence that tools become integrated into these body repre-
sentations has come via various experimental routes. Changes in
the body schema are most directly observed by monitoring the
kinematics of action execution. In a study by Cardinali et al.
(2009), participants who used a mechanical grabber subsequently
changed the kinematics of their empty-handed movements, point-
ing and grasping as if their arms had lengthened. Simple motor
learning was an unlikely account for these changes, as the
kinematics of tool-use itself did not change throughout the period
in which the mechanical grabber was used. Given that tool-use
induced changes in empty-handed actions, the results suggested
that a change had occurred in a generalized model of action
generation. These ﬁndings therefore imply a highly plastic repre-
sentation of the body schema, similar to what had been suggested
by Head and Holmes almost a century prior.
The other major class of tool-use experiments uses measures of
multimodal integration to investigate body representations
(Maravita & Iriki, 2004). Certain sensory processes are selective
for stimuli originating from within “peripersonal space”, which
corresponds to the reachable or “actionable” space immediately
surrounding the body. Bodily representations both deﬁne the
extent of this space, and also form a basis for the spatial mapping
of sensory stimuli within it. Thus, monitoring changes in the
extent and organization of this sensory space allows one to infer
changes in body representations.
A lot of what is known about body representations in periper-
sonal space comes from neurophysiological studies in primates.
Fronto-parietal networks have been identiﬁed that continuously
update spatial representations of body shape and posture. These
networks integrate multimodal sensory information (primarily
proprioceptive, somatosensory and visual information) such that
it is functionally relevant to speciﬁc actions, and serves the ability
to localize the body in space (Colby, 1998; Maravita, Spence, &
Driver, 2003; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997). Notably,
there are neurons in ventral-premotor cortex that have both
somatosensory and visual receptive ﬁelds, coding for the space
surrounding the same body part. These bimodal neurons integrate
information such that even if a body part (for example a hand)
is moved through space, the visual receptive ﬁeld remains
anchored to the body part it belongs to Graziano, Yap, and Gross
(1994).
Intriguingly, these fronto-parietal networks can represent
external objects in a similar fashion. After weeks of practice with
a simple tool, bimodal neurons in intraparietal cortex of macaques
were found to expand their visual receptive ﬁelds to include the
space surrounding the tool whenever the monkey was engaged in
deliberate tool interaction (Iriki, Tanaka, & Iwamura, 1996). This
ﬁnding suggests that peripersonal space can be expanded via the
use of a tool (but see also Holmes (2012)). Similarly, a study
investigating structural brain changes in macaques exposed to
tool-use training for the ﬁrst time, showed an increase in grey
matter volume in fronto-parietal areas including intraparietal
cortex (Quallo et al., 2009). In a study of a human patient with
right-hemisphere lesions, tool-use altered the domain in which
visual neglect was experienced. Whereas the patient's visual
neglect was typically restricted to judgments regarding stimuli
in peripersonal space, the neglect spread to more distant areas if
the task was performed using a long pointing tool, again sugges-
tive of the expansion of peripersonal space (Berti & Frassinetti,
2000). Increased multisensory weights assigned to the processing
of visual stimuli around the functional part of a tool are likely
responsible for the remapping of peripersonal space to include this
new region of space after tool-use (Holmes, 2012). Note that none
of these studies probed motor output as a dependent measure, so
it is unclear whether these body representations subserve action
planning as a body schema, or if they subserve only perceptual
processing.
The present study utilizes another method of probing bodily
representations, which has recently been extended to investigate tool
use. The paradigm involves a cross-modal effect whereby propriocep-
tive inputs profoundly disrupt visual representations of the body
(Bross, 2000; Davies, 1973a; Gregory, Wallace, & Campbell, 1959). In
these experiments, participants in a completely darkened room are
exposed to a brief ﬂash of light, which creates a crisp, long-lasting
afterimage of the entire ﬁeld of view. When the afterimage includes a
body part, such as the participant's arm, moving the arm from
its imaged position causes the afterimage of the arm to ‘fade’ or
‘crumble’ while the rest of the afterimage scene remains intact. The
mismatch between proprioceptive and visual representations of the
same body part leads to a Gestalt-like disruption of the visual percept.
Versions of this experiment done with mirrors conﬁrm that this fading
effect occurs in accordance with proprioceptive and visual representa-
tions organized on the basis of one’s own body (Ritchie & Carlson,
2010).
Such afterimage-based experiments have also demonstrated
the rapid modulation of body representations to include held
objects. Carlson, Alvarez, Wu and Verstraten (2010) showed that
objects grasped by the observer (referred to as ‘ﬁrst-order’ objects)
faded upon being dropped. Similarly, when the observer removed
a ﬁrst-order object from the area of peripersonal space being
viewed in the afterimage, the object would also fade. This
indicates that somatosensory and proprioceptive information is
integrated with visual information in much the same way for both
held objects and body parts.
Afterimage studies do not investigate motor output, and thus
the body representations that were probed may or may not
function as body schema. The representations seem more clearly
akin to the ones probed in the studies of peripersonal space. Both
involve multisensory integration and measurements based on
perceptual outcomes. Using the afterimage paradigm, we aim to
address several related issues raised by the preceding studies.
What kinds of external objects are assimilated? What factors
govern whether or not an object is assimilated? How quickly does
assimilation occur?
Although the monkey physiology studies found that tool
integration developed after weeks of use (Iriki et al., 1996), the
human behavioral studies found tool integration as soon as the
tools were grasped (Cardinali et al., 2009; Carlson et al., 2010).
The behavioral ﬁndings closely match our daily functioning and
the feeling that we can rapidly assimilate objects (like picking up a
pen and beginning to write). There are many functional advan-
tages to a body system capable of rapidly incorporating, as well as
disincorporating, an object or tool. The ability to readily expand
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the physical body in a functional manner via tool-use enables us to
do numerous things that would not otherwise be possible, such as
removing hot coals from a ﬁre or hitting a nail into a wall. Being
able to readily disincorporate a tool after it is no longer used
allows us to keep a coherent sense of the body’s boundaries. Such
short-lived changes in the brain’s representation of the body
might be most effectively established by ﬂexibly updating repre-
sentations of peripersonal space (Bruggeman, Kliman-Silver,
Domini, & Song, 2013; Carlson et al., 2010; Holmes, 2012). How-
ever, extending the body into space for functional purposes could
also involve updating of the action oriented body schema
(Cardinali et al., 2009).
Such a ﬂexible system could be beneﬁcial for the incorporation of
tools, but also for objects held by tools. Certainly we do many things
involving second, or even higher order extensions. Extreme examples
of this are operating construction vehicles, performing robotic
surgery, etc. But there are also many more low-tech examples, such
as the use of chopsticks to manipulate food while eating a meal.
Taking this marked degree of ﬂexibility, and the goal-oriented nature
of tool-use and body representations into account, one could readily
anticipate representations for higher-order extensions.
However, the afterimage experiments revealed complex results
regarding second-order extensions. When participants used a sim-
ple, table-supported, mechanical arm that could grip objects when
squeezing a handle, objects held by the tool did not fade from the
afterimage when participants released the arm’s handle (Bruggeman
et al., 2013; Carlson et al., 2010). This ﬁnding demonstrates that an
observer’s ability to consciously predict the consequences of an
action (e.g. a hand movement leading to release of an object) is not
sufﬁcient to induce fading of an object from the afterimage.
But in light of the sensitivity that the body’s representation has
for afferent sensory input (Carlson et al., 2010; Hogendoorn,
Kammers, Carlson, & Verstraten, 2009) the apparent failure to
integrate higher-order external objects seems counter to our daily
experience. In fact, the study by Bruggeman et al. shows that
second-order objects can also fade from the afterimage when
released from a mechanical arm, as long as participants are able to
freely wield the tool. Contrary to using a tool while it is ﬁxed to a
table, freely wielding the same tool offers rich somatosensory
feedback, providing the information necessary to experience
fading of a second-order object (Bruggeman et al., 2013).
The critical factor, Bruggeman et al. suggest, is that target
objects can be perceived directly, or indirectly via a tool, through
‘dynamic touch’. Dynamic touch can be deﬁned by the combined
muscular effort and sensory consequences of manipulating an
object (Gibson, 1966; Yamamoto & Kitazawa, 2001). Mechanor-
eceptors in the hand are able to detect mechanical forces (such as
torque, and moment of inertia) that emerge when one manip-
ulates a tool, and such signals (mainly the inertia tensor) can be
used by the brain to quantify for example the length of a handheld
object without requiring vision (Turvey, 1996). Dynamically
manipulating an object involves both perception and action,
allowing the object to become incorporated into the action and
somatosensory system (Bruggeman et al., 2013).
The importance of action is also demonstrated by studies
where the simple physical presence of a tool does not induce
remapping of peripersonal space, which instead requires deliber-
ate tool-action (Farnè, Iriki, & Làdavas, 2005; Iriki et al., 1996;
Wagman & Carello, 2001). Moreover, the ability to predict action
outcomes is crucial for tool-use, and requires a tight link between
motor predictions and feedback from the somatosensory system
(Wolpert, Goodbody, & Husain, 1998; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2010).
Thus, a ﬂexible and quickly adaptive system consisting of a feed-
back loop between perception and action would be well suited to
the demands of rapidly incorporating and disincorporating
second-order objects and tools.
Given that (afterimage) studies in humans reveal a highly
ﬂexible and rapidly changing body representation, capable of
assimilating even second-order objects, why do studies of maca-
que neurophysiology only reveal slowly changing representations?
One explanation for this might be the existence of multiple
representations that differ in learning speed, as proposed by
Carlson et al. (2010). Alternatively, differences in assimilation
speed of objects could be due to the amount of sensorimotor
feedback provided by a given tool (Bruggeman et al., 2013). Finally,
differing assimilation speeds found by various studies could stem
from important differences between species. Whereas humans are
dexterous tool-users, lower primates are not consistently known
to engage in the spontaneous use of tools (Iriki et al., 1996;
Tomasello & Call, 1997). It’s been suggested that, in macaques,
training is needed to activate silent neurogenetic mechanisms
(Ishibashi et al., 2002b; Tomasello & Call, 1997), which represent a
precursor of the tool-use abilities acquired by humans over the
continued course of evolution (Ishibashi et al., 2002a). This could
account for the slower buildup needed to ﬁnd integration of
external tools into the body representation of monkeys.
At present, studies in human subjects have not tested for changes
in tool integration across the long timescales present in the monkey
studies. Conceivably, long-term practice could improve somatosen-
sory perception of a tool, leading to better predictions of motor
actions performed with that tool. Such slowly evolving improve-
ments in dynamic touch may drive neural plasticity during tool-use,
changing the extent to which second-order objects are assimilated.
This would reveal whether plasticity in the human body representa-
tion underlying the fading effect contains a slow component.
In the present study, we use the afterimage paradigm to
investigate tool integration during the use of chopsticks. Chopsticks
provide rich somatosensory feedback during use, and are thus a
good choice where dynamic touch is important. We ﬁrst verify the
existence of second-order integration by using chopsticks. This is not
entirely a given, since chopsticks rely more on ﬁnger representation
and kinesthesia, while the long mechanical grabbers used in
previous research are likely to rely on information from more
proximal parts of the hand and arm representations (Bruggeman
et al., 2013; Cardinali et al., 2009, 2012; Carlson et al., 2010).
Second, we test for both elements of rapid integration and build-up
through training. In two successive experiments we assess whether
skillfulness with a tool can modulate potential rapid integration, and
whether extensive tool practice in humans can result in long-term
integration processes, similar to that found in monkeys. Throughout,
we compare participants’ dominant and non-dominant hands, which
provides within-subject control. Also, this helps us answer a third
possible question, since the degree of life experience with a tool
needed to modulate the fading effect is an open question–handedness
covers one extreme, since it is built up over one’s entire lifetime.
Here, we demonstrate that second-order objects do fade fairly
frequently, validating the idea that space representations around the
body can be modiﬁed to include second-order objects. We ﬁnd that
such integration of second-order objects includes both a rapid
component, as well as a longer-term component that can be built
up over the course of extensive training. These ﬁndings provide a link
between the fast and highly ﬂexible integration of objects found in
many behavioral studies with humans, and the slower buildup of
tool integration through training found in monkey studies.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Fifty-nine healthy volunteers were recruited from Maastricht University (35
female, 51 right-handed, mean age 22 years). Data from eight participants were
excluded due to missing audio-recordings (n¼1), inability to hold chopsticks (n¼1)
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and failing a pre-experimental screening procedure (see below, n¼6). Eight
volunteers, including two of the authors (RR and IB) also participated in experi-
ment 2: a four-week training and post-training assessment. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, agreed to the use of voice-recordings
and provided written informed consent. Participants were reimbursed by means
of course credit. The study took place under the approval of the standing
ethical committee of the Psychology and Neuroscience department at Maastricht
University.
2.2. Materials and procedure
Experiments were conducted in a completely darkened room. Participants
were seated facing a table and wall covered by a black cloth (1.56 cd/m2) extending
601 of visual angle horizontally. Afterimages were created using a handheld
Vivitar 285HV Zoom Thyristor ﬂashgun directed at the ceiling. Participants’ verbal
reports were collected with an iRiver (iHP-120 multi-codec jukebox) device.
Wooden chopsticks (24 cm in length, unﬁnished) were employed for all experi-
mental operations: experimental trials, training and a skill test. The second-order
objects were cotton balls dyed in black tea (88.3 cd/m2), which were easily
graspable with chopsticks and provided no auditory feedback when dropped.
Because our experiment depends on the ability of participants to experience
object fading, we conducted a separate pre-experimental screening procedure
assessing the ability of each participant to see changes in the positive afterimage in
response to bodily movement (Carlson et al., 2010). Participants were excluded
from further participation if no such changes were reported after six screening
trials. Prior to the experiment, participants were instructed how to hold chopsticks
(one pair in each hand) and were allowed a brief practice. We instructed
participants to keep their elbows on the table in front of them, positioning their
hands 30 cm in front of their face and 35 cm apart. Participants maintained
stable ﬁxation by steadily gazing at a point halfway between their hands. After
instructions, participants were dark adapted for 10 min.
An experimental trial (Fig. 1) started with participants using the chopsticks in
each hand to pick up two cotton balls. A ﬂash was emitted and participants verbally
indicated the start of their afterimage, whereafter they dropped one of the two
cotton balls. Participants described any perceived differences between the two
sides: the Action Side from which the object was dropped versus the Stationary
Side where nothing was dropped. To provide a measure of overall afterimage
duration, participants indicated when the entire afterimage had faded back to
complete darkness. After each trial participants had to pick the cotton balls back up
in preparation for the following trial. In order to accomplish this we used a red laser
pointer to help participants get their bearings in the dark. Since the wavelength of
red light falls outside of the sensitivity range for retinal rods, this was a useful way
to prepare for upcoming trials without disturbing dark adaptation.
Each participant performed 20 trials: a cotton ball was dropped from the
chopsticks in the dominant and the non-dominant hand 10 times each, switching
sides every 5 trials (counterbalanced across participants).
After completion of the experimental trials, participants performed a skill test
with chopsticks using their dominant hand. During part A (3 trials), participants
moved 10 small, curved objects (uncooked macaroni, 8 mm in length) from one cup
into another (diameter¼8.4 cm; height¼5.85 cm) over a distance of 20 cm. During
part B (3 trials), participants moved 5 small square objects (standard dice, 15-mm
cubes) over a distance of 20 cm, stacking them on top of each other. Direction of
movement (left-to-right or right-to-left) was counterbalanced across trials, and the
order of the two parts was counterbalanced across participants. We assume that
faster performance indicates higher degree of skill, allowing the average trial
duration to represent a measure of chopstick-skill. However, the ecological validity
of part B was questionable, since it contained a spatial component and was prone to
catastrophic errors in cases where the stacked objects would tip over. This is
reﬂected in the large variability of performance on part B (mean¼43.44 s;
SEM¼5.58 s) compared to part A (mean¼49.09 s; SEM¼2.74 s). Since it wasn’t
possible to evaluate post-hoc which trials had involved catastrophic error(s), and to
avoid classifying many participants as outliers, participant’s chopstick proﬁciency
was deﬁned as the average trial duration on part A of our skill test. After outlier
removal (99.3 coverage, sdE2.7, removed N¼1), average trial completion time was
47.75 s (SEM¼2.44). Note that the main results of the research presented here are
identical whether skill is deﬁned based on the full test, or on part A alone.
After completing experiment 1, eight participants continued with chopstick
training in a naturalistic setting. For a period of 4 weeks they ate at least one meal
per day with chopsticks, using their dominant hand (15–28 meals per participant,
mean¼23.5 meals). Participants were tested again after training, exactly as in
Experiment 1. Since training exclusively targeted the dominant hand, the non-
dominant, non-trained hand served as a within-subject control.
2.3. Analyses
Reports on the appearance of objects in afterimages can vary widely between
individuals (Davies, 1973a, 1973b). In this study, responses ranged from ‘no
perceived differences’ to ‘premature fading’, ‘transparent dimming’, or even
complete disappearance of one or several objects in the afterimage. We categorized
responses as in Carlson et al. (2010), labeling reports (based on descriptions of the
second-order objects) indicating greater fading on the Action Side vs. Stationary
Side as positive responses. Two independent observers blindly rated every voice
recording collected.
Due to the binary nature of our outcome measure (fading vs. no fading), and
difﬁculties associated with modelling probability which has a restricted range of 0–
1, we analyzed the data using logistic regression models in Stata (StataCorp., 2009).
Speciﬁcally, we used a logistic random-intercept model, which allows ﬁtting
individual intercepts to participant’s data to account for inter-individual differences
in baseline fading experiences. Interactions were interpreted using simple slope
analyses. In Experiment 1, skill was modeled as a continuous between-subjects
variable, and the hand used to perform the action was modeled as a categorical
within-subjects variable. In Experiment 2 both training and hand were modeled as
categorical within-subject variables.
3. Results
3.1. Experiment 1: Second-order fading, skill and lifetime-built motor
ﬂuency
Second-order integration, as indicated by fading of a cotton ball
held with chopsticks from the Action Side was experienced on 26%
of experimental trials (t¼9.762; po0.0001, one-sided against
zero). This ﬁnding uncovers the ability of human observers to
rapidly integrate the chopsticks into the body representation, with
the chopsticks providing rich cross-modal expectations about the
effects of dropping the second-order cotton ball.
With regard to handedness, we ﬁnd that at a mean skill level,
the odds of experiencing fading are 46.4% higher when the cotton
ball is dropped from the chopsticks in the dominant, as opposed to
the non-dominant hand (exp(B)¼0.381; p¼0.025). Moreover, our
discharge flash (~1 ms)
complete darkness, report ‘stop’
start trial
discharge flash (~1 ms)
start trial
afterimage formation
report ‘start’ (~1-2 s)
drop cotton ball (~500 ms)
afterimage description (~5-35 s)
complete darkness, report ‘stop’
afterimage description (~5-35 s)
afterimage formation
report ‘start’ (~1-2 s)
drop cotton ball (~500 ms)
PROCEDURE PERCEPT
time
Fig. 1. Trial sequence. An experimental trial began with participants sitting in
complete darkness while holding a pair of chopsticks in each hand, and a cotton
ball between each pair of chopsticks. After discharge of a ﬂash, participants were
instructed to drop a cotton ball upon formation of the afterimage from either the
dominant or the non-dominant hand. Participants then described any perceived
differences between the objects in the afterimage, comparing the Action Side
(where the cotton ball was dropped) with the Stationary Side (where the cotton
ball was stationary).
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data also revealed an interaction between hand and skill (exp
(B)¼0.031; p¼0.004). As depicted in Fig. 2a, when dropping the
cotton ball from the chopsticks in the non-dominant hand, skill
level did not inﬂuence the amount of fading participants experi-
enced (exp(B)¼0.001; p¼0.948). However, when using the domi-
nant hand, more skilled (faster) participants perceived more
fading of the cotton balls (larger log odds) than those participants
whose skill with chopsticks was poorer. In fact, the odds of
experiencing a cotton ball fading increased 0.03% for every second
a participant was faster on the chopstick-skill test (exp(B)¼
0.029; p¼0.035). The model provided a good ﬁt for the data (Wald
Chi-Square(3)¼16.33; p¼0.001).
Note that the results depicted in Fig. 2 are expressed in log odds
of fading. The relationship between log odds and probability can
be deﬁned as:
log oddsðpÞ ¼ log pð1pÞ
 
where p stands for the probability of fading. As a reference, log
odds of zero correspond to a 50% chance of perceived fading,
whereas log odds smaller than zero indicate a chance of fading
which is less than 50%.
Afterimage durations were not affected by our experimental
manipulations. Linear regression revealed no relationship between
skill and duration of the afterimage (dominant hand: R2o0.0001;
slope¼0.001 with 95% CI¼[0.099–0.101]. Non-dominant hand:
R2¼0.005; slope¼0.024 with 95% CI¼[0.125–0.077]). More-
over, afterimages were of similar durations regardless of the hand
used to drop the cotton ball (t¼0.004; p¼0.502, one-sided).
Afterimages lasted 11.93 s on average (SEM¼0.821), which is in
line with previous reports of 10 s afterimages (Carlson et al.,
2010; Hogendoorn et al., 2009).
3.2. Experiment 2: Training and second-order fading
An assessment of the amount of fading experienced by our
participants before and after training revealed that training
improved the odds of experiencing cotton ball fading by 76.36%
(exp(B)¼0.567; p¼0.037; Fig. 2b). This is a strong indication that
modiﬁcations to the representation of one’s own body can be
strengthened over time by extensive tool practice. Independent of
training, participant’s odds of experiencing fading of the cotton
ball were higher (138%) when the cotton ball was dropped from
the chopsticks in the dominant, as opposed to the non-dominant
hand (exp(B)¼0.867; p¼0.002; Fig. 2b). This ﬁnding mirrors
results from Experiment 1. The overall model predicted the data
well (Wald Chi-Square(2)¼13.75; p¼0.001).
We expected improved long-term integration of the ﬁrst-order
tool for the trained (dominant) hand, but not for the untrained (non-
dominant) hand. Hence, we also tested the impact of training on
second-order object fading for both hands separately (Fig. 2b and c).
Participants’ odds of experiencing cotton ball fading were 215.19%
increased for the dominant hand after training (exp(B)¼1.148;
p¼0.008). This ﬁnding holds true after a strict correction for multiple
comparisons (p¼0.016). In contrast, the non-dominant hand shows
no differences before and after training (exp(B)¼0.168; p¼0.682).
Finally, a 2-way repeated measures ANOVA showed that the
duration of the afterimage was not affected by training (F(1,7)¼
1.788; p¼0.223), nor the hand used to drop the cotton ball
(F(1,7)¼0.853; p¼0.387).
Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate participants’
ability to integrate both ﬁrst-, as well as second-order objects into the
body representation, whereby the success of second-order integration
changes as a function of familiarity with the ﬁrst-order tool.
3.3. Skill performance and individual differences
After the 4-week training, skill with chopsticks was signiﬁ-
cantly improved (t¼2.745; p¼0.029; Fig. 3a). Interestingly, we
also found a high correlation between the time spent on the skill
task at baseline and skill improvement (r¼0.921; p¼0.001;
Fig. 3b). This implies that participants with low baseline-skill
beneﬁted most from training. A possible explanation for this could
be near-ceiling performance of high-skilled individuals at baseline.
Regression toward the mean is a less likely interpretation, since
participants who were slower at baseline got faster after training,
whereas participants who were already fast at baseline did not
really get slower. The reduction of variance after training also
argues against a random redistribution of skill-test scores.
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Large inter-individual differences are characteristic of the way
changes in positive afterimages are perceived (Davies, 1973a, 1973b).
Here we ﬁnd that, despite large between-subject variability (0–90%
fading experienced across participants), the amount of second-order
object fading within individual participants is fairly stable. The
frequency of fading experiences was correlated between the domi-
nant and non-dominant hand (r¼0.494; p¼0.0003). Moreover,
comparing the amount of fading before and after training explains
33.87% of variance (r¼0.582; p¼0.018), indicating stability over time.
Thus, the amount of fading a person experienced could be partly
explained by individual proneness to such fading.
4. Discussion
This study demonstrates that the representation of the body can
be extended beyond ﬁrst-order limitations to also include second-
order objects held by a tool. Participants dropped cotton balls from a
pair of chopsticks, and these cotton balls faded from a stable visual
scene on approximately one-fourth of all occasions. This expands the
domain in which second-order fading has been demonstrated, since
fading of “objects held by held objects” has not been observed before
in situations where tool-use mainly relies on somatosensory and
kinesthetic information from more distal parts of the hand.
We furthermore demonstrated that this fading effect was
modulated by both skill and learning. Skillfulness with the ﬁrst-
order chopsticks actively inﬂuenced the amount of rapid integra-
tion found for the second-order cotton balls, as indexed by a
higher degree of fading of these cotton balls in more-skilled
participants. A slower buildup of integration was found after
extensive training with the chopsticks, indicating an additional
long-term component. Thus, skill and learning can interact with
the extended representation of the body. No systematic changes in
afterimage durations were uncovered across the various experi-
mental conditions. This helps rule out observer bias, since we
relied on subjective reports to determine both fading of imaged
objects, as well as fading of the entire imaged scene. Since scene
complexity was constant across conditions, the lack of variability
in afterimage duration is in line with previous ﬁndings (Davies,
1973a).
After a month of practice, fading of cotton balls dropped from
chopsticks in the trained (dominant) hand increased to 50% of
observations. Fading of cotton balls from chopsticks in the untrained
(non-dominant) hand remained unchanged, revealing the speciﬁcity
of this training-induced modiﬁcation of the body representation in
our participants. Throughout the experiment, participants experi-
enced more fading when using their more-skilled dominant hand
(29.1–32.9%), compared to their non-dominant hand (22.4–26.3%).
This difference might be explained by a general difference in lifetime-
built motor ﬂuency between the two hands; the dominant hand
typically being the more practiced. Motor ﬂuency reﬂects motor
ability in a more general sense, and can be considered independent
from tool-speciﬁc skill, which is the type of skill people acquire
through (extensive) experience with a speciﬁc tool. Our results show
that at very low levels of skill, similar amounts of second-order
fading were experienced irrespective of the hand used. General
differences in motor ﬂuency cannot fully account for this, indicating
that tool speciﬁc experiences (like those acquired during training)
might prove integral for assimilation of external objects into an
extended representation of the body.
Furthermore, the ﬁnding from Experiment 2 that training leads to
more second-order object fading is an important one, since it allows
us to draw an even more deﬁnitive distinction between general
motor ﬂuency and tool-speciﬁc skill. General motor ﬂuency and tool-
speciﬁc skill are probably often correlated, but there can be devia-
tions between the two. To take an extreme example, a generally
dexterous undergraduate student with no experience handling
chopsticks might do better on the skill task from our experiment
compared to a clumsy 90-year old subject who has eaten with
chopsticks their whole life. Which personwould see more fading? As
this example demonstrates, general skill or dexterity might not
necessarily mean that a person has more tool-speciﬁc experience.
Thus, our ﬁrst experiment does not provide an unequivocal answer
to the question why people who do better on the skill test see more
fading. Based on the results from Experiment 1, participants who saw
more fading may have had more tool-speciﬁc skill with chopsticks,
but it is also possible that these participants were simply less clumsy
and more dexterous in general. The second experiment resolves this
question, favoring an interpretation that stresses actual tool experi-
ence as a modulator of the fading effect.
Selective fading of an object from the afterimage has previously
been considered evidence for integration of that object into the body
schema, based on the underlying assumption that only items which
are part of the body schema will fade (Carlson et al., 2010). However,
any region in the afterimage where conﬂict arises between vision
and proprioception is susceptible to fading, and fading can be
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modulated by higher-order experiences such as sense of ownership
(Hogendoorn et al., 2009). Fading might therefore be more conserva-
tively characterized as the resolution to a conﬂict between the visual
afterimage and the expectation that forms on the basis of somato-
sensory and proprioceptive information—instead of proof that an
object was integrated into the body schema. Thus, fading is a
demonstration that we have a rich, context sensitive ability to
formulate cross-modal expectations about the behavior of external
objects with which we interact.
The importance of training for improved tool-integration, as
indexed by fading of second-order objects from the positive after-
image, could stem from a honing of a participant’s ability to
differentiate amongst subtle yet complex mechanical forces sensed
through dynamic touch. If such sources of information are not clearly
discernable prior to training, an increased sensitivity of the haptic
perceptual system could be an important requirement for becoming
a more ﬂuent tool-user. We demonstrate here that with experience, a
tool that was not originally part of the body becomes capable of
providing sufﬁciently rich cross-modal expectations about the effects
of tool actions, such that the tool essentially becomes incorporated in
the body representation as an effector. By incorporating a tool
(chopsticks), the consequences of motor actions with that tool
(releasing a cotton ball) become better predictable. Thus, the ability
to ﬂexibly map movements and their consequences proves para-
mount to the integration of ﬁrst- and higher-order objects into the
body representation.
We have assumed here that this improved link between
multimodal predictions and action consequences means that
tool-use modiﬁes our representation of peripersonal space. How-
ever, what can these results tell us about the body schema, or even
the body image? Probing the body schema can be done via tasks
involving proper tool-use, which has been deﬁned as using a tool
in a way that includes a causal interaction, and contact with, the
object acted upon (Cardinali et al., 2012). According to this
deﬁnition, observers in our experiment were involved in actions
(namely dropping a cotton ball from a pair of chopsticks) that tap
into the unconscious body schema representation. Nevertheless,
our observer’s task was perceptual in nature, namely judging
which of two cotton balls is more visible in an afterimage and
giving a verbal response. Such a task does not directly explore
kinematics; potential integration of the chopsticks and cotton ball
into the body schema of our participants therefore remains only
tentative.
Though perceptual in nature, our task also does not directly probe
the way chopsticks and cotton ball are sensed by our participants, as
would be required when investigating the body image. Instead, our
study uses participant’s perceptual reports as an indirect measure for
an underlying system for action and tool-use. This interpretation
(that our task does not probe the body image) is in line with previous
research demonstrating that tools cannot be integrated into the body
image (Cardinali et al., 2011, 2012). For example, grasping move-
ments only affected the report of arm length when reports were
made via a pointing movement towards a tactile stimulus on the arm
(emphasizing the body schema), but not when reports and location
on the arm were indicated verbally (emphasizing the body image)
(Cardinali et al., 2011).
Humans have uniquely adapted for the use of tools with a
ﬂexibility and versatility that far surpasses other primates (Davies,
1973a; Seed & Byrne, 2010). Non-human primates on the other
hand demonstrate relatively rudimentary tool-usage with moder-
ate levels of inferential causal reasoning (Fujita, Kuroshima, & Asai,
2003; Goodall, 1986; McGrew, 2010; Vaesen, 2012; Visalberghi
et al., 2009). Given these differences at the behavioral level, one
could hypothesize that humans have evolved to naturally and
rapidly assimilate ﬁrst-order representations—thus having an
innate capacity for tool-use (Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Peeters
et al., 2009; Vaesen, 2012). Conversely, non-human primates
may require substantive tool training to initiate the appropriate
brain changes, which could include reorganization of somatosen-
sory and visual signals (Ishibashi et al., 2002a; Ueno & Fujita, 1998)
and the creation of novel neural connections (Hihara et al., 2006;
Ishibashi et al., 2002b).
We have demonstrated here that humans can integrate not only
ﬁrst-, but also second-order representations, whereby the success of
second-order integration changes as a function of familiarity with the
ﬁrst-order tool. Thus, when it comes to strengthening the feedback
loop between tool perception and action consequences via training
(thereby improving predictions for second-order extensions), the
human situation might be akin to that of non-human primates—
training is required to get the brain wired up for the task. For the
time being, these conclusions remain tentative, since the task
differences between most human and monkey work are substantial,
and different processes could be involved.
The work presented here aims to bridge two diverging direc-
tions in the current literature, one involving rapid integration
suggested by human psychophysical experiments (Bruggeman
et al., 2013; Cardinali et al., 2009; Carlson et al., 2010), while the
other is the much slower buildup of representations described in
monkey physiology (Iriki et al., 1996). Based on the novel ﬁndings
presented here, we suggest that the ability to modify body
representations to include external objects can happen continu-
ously, without previously suggested discrete limitations in terms
of time and space (Carlson et al., 2010). We suggest that integra-
tion might happen anywhere along a temporal continuum: One
might expect very rapid integration for highly familiar or intuitive
extensions, but more limited – practice dependent – integration
when items are unfamiliar. Additionally, such variations in inte-
gration speed are likely related to the amount of sensorimotor
feedback provided by a tool, which can be improved via training.
Also, we propose that the degree with which one can extend
oneself into the environment is not constrained in an absolute
sense: as the number of extensions increases, the probability of
integration might drop, but such constraints could hypothetically
be lifted given enough training. A more continuous view might
similarly explain differences between species, with more dexter-
ous tool-users hypothetically having more potential in terms of
the possible number of extensions, or speed of integration. Future
research could establish the exact limits of the capacity to
incorporate objects not originally part of the body.
Funding
R.L.R. was supported by a grant from the Netherlands Organi-
zation for Scientiﬁc Research (Graduate School for Cognitive and
Clinical Neuroscience, NWO 22.001.036). A.T.S. was supported by
the European Research Council under the European Union’s
Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007–2013)/ERC Grant agree-
ment no. [263472].
Acknowledgements
We thank research-practical group 226 for data collection, Erik
Kimbrough, Jan Schepers, and Todd Sorensen for valuable input
regarding data analysis, and Sam Ling for his advise and feedback
on the manuscript.
References
Berti, A, & Frassinetti, F (2000). When far becomes near: Remapping of space by
tool use. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 12(3), 415–420.
R.L. Rademaker et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 196–203202
Botvinick, M, & Cohen, J (1998). Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch that eyes see. Nature, 391
(6669), 756.
Bross, M (2000). Emmert’s law in the dark: Active and passive proprioceptive
effects on positive visual afterimages. Perception, 29(11), 1385–1391.
Bruggeman, H, Kliman-Silver, C, Domini, F, & Song, J H (2013). Dynamic manipula-
tion generates touch information that can modify vision. Psychological Science,
24(6), 1063–1065.
Cardinali, L, Frassinetti, F, Brozzoli, C, Urquizar, C, Roy, A C, & Farne, A (2009). Tool-
use induces morphological updating of the body schema. Current Biology, 19
(13), 1157.
Cardinali, L, Brozzoli, C, Urquizar, C, Salemme, R, Roy, A C, & Farnè, A (2011). When
action is not enough: Tool-use reveals tactile-dependent access to body
schema. Neuropsychologia, 49(13), 3750–3757.
Cardinali, L, Jacobs, S, Brozzoli, C, Frassinetti, F, Roy, A C, & Farnè, A (2012). Grab an
object with a tool and change your body: Tool-use-dependent changes of body
representation for action. Experimental Brain Research, 218(2), 259–271.
Carlson, T A, Alvarez, G, Wu, D-A, & Verstraten, F A J (2010). Rapid assimilation of
external objects into the body schema. Psychological Science, 21(7), 1000–1005.
Colby, C L (1998). Action-oriented spatial reference frames in cortex. Neuron, 20(1),
15–24.
Davies, P (1973a). Effects of movements upon the appearance and duration of a
prolonged visual afterimage: 1. Changes arising from the movement of a
portion of the body incorporated in the afterimaged scene. Perception, 2,
147–153.
Davies, P (1973b). Effects of movements upon the appearance and duration of a
prolonged visual afterimage: 2. Changes arising from movement of the
observer in relation to the previously afterimaged scene. Perception, 2, 155–160.
Farnè, A, Iriki, A, & Làdavas, E (2005). Shaping multisensory action-space with tools:
Evidence from patients with cross-modal extinction. Neuropsychologia, 43(2),
238–248.
Fujita, K, Kuroshima, H, & Asai, S (2003). How do tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) understand causality involved in tool use? Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 29(3), 233–242.
Gibson, J J (1966). The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton
Mifﬂin.
Goodall, J (1986). The chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of behavior. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Goodwin, G M, McCloskey, D I, & Matthews, P B (1972). Proprioceptive illusions
induced by muscle vibration: Contribution by muscle spindles to perception?
Science, 175(4028), 1382–1384.
Graziano, M, Yap, G, & Gross, C (1994). Coding of visual space by premotor neurons.
Science, 266(5187), 1054–1057.
Gregory, R L, Wallace, J G, & Campbell, F W (1959). Changes in the size and shape of
visual after-images observed in complete darkness during changes of position
in space. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 11(1), 54–55.
Head, H, & Holmes, G (1911). Sensory disturbances from cerebral lesions. Brain, 34
(2–3), 102–254.
Hihara, S, Notoya, T, Tanaka, M, Ichinose, S, Ojima, H, Obayashi, S, et al. (2006).
Extension of corticocortical afferents into the anterior bank of the intraparietal
sulcus by tool-use training in adult monkeys. Neuropsychologia, 44(13),
2636–2646.
Hogendoorn, H, Kammers, M P M, Carlson, T A, & Verstraten, F A J (2009). Being in
the dark about your hand: Resolution of visuo-proprioceptive conﬂict by
disowning visible limbs. Neuropsychologia, 47(13), 2698–2703.
Holmes, N P (2012). Does tool use extend peripersonal space? A review and
re-analysis. Experimental Brain Research, 218(2), 273–282.
Iriki, A, Tanaka, M, & Iwamura, Y (1996). Coding of modiﬁed body schema during
tool use by macaque postcentral neurones. Neuroreport, 7(14), 2325–2330.
Ishibashi, H, Hihara, S, Takahashi, M, Heike, T, Yokota, T, & Iriki, A (2002a). Tool-use
learning induces BDNF expression in a selective portion of monkey anterior
parietal cortex. Brain Research Molecular Brain Research, 102(1–2), 110–112.
Ishibashi, H, Hihara, S, Takahashi, M, Heike, T, Yokota, T, & Iriki, A (2002b). Tool-use
learning selectively induces expression of brain-derived neurotrophic factor, its
receptor trkB, and neurotrophin 3 in the intraparietal multisensorycortex of
monkeys. Brain Research Cognitive Brain Research, 14(1), 3–9.
Kammers, M P M, Kootker, J A, Hogendoorn, H, & Dijkerman, H C (2010). How many
motoric body representations can we grasp? Experimental Brain Research, 202
(1), 203–212.
Maravita, A., & Iriki, A. (2004). Tools for the body (schema). Trends in Cognitive
Sciences (Regul Ed), 8(2), 79–86.
Maravita, A, Spence, C, & Driver, J (2003). Multisensory integration and the body
schema: Close to hand and within reach. Current Biology, 13(13), R531–539.
McGrew, W C (2010). Evolution. Chimpanzee technology. Science, 328(5978), 579–580.
Peeters, R, Simone, L, Nelissen, K, Fabbri-Destro, M, Vanduffel, W, Rizzolatti, G, et al.
(2009). The representation of tool use in humans and monkeys: Common and
uniquely human features. Journal of Neuroscience, 29(37), 11523–11539.
Quallo, M. M., Price, C. J., Ueno, K., Asamizuya, T., Cheng, K., Lemon, R. N., et al.
(2009). Gray and white matter changes associated with tool-use learning in
macaque monkeys. Proceedings of the National academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, 106(43), 18379–18384.
Ritchie, J. B., & Carlson, T. (2010). Mirror, mirror, on the wall, is that even my hand at
all? Changes in the afterimage of one’s reﬂection in a mirror in response to
bodily movement. Neuropsychologia, 48(5), 1495–1500.
Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (1997). The space around us.
Science, 277(5323), 190.
Seed, A., & Byrne, R. (2010). Animal tool-use. Current Biology, 20(23), R1032–R1039.
Tomasello, M., & Call, J. (1997). Primate cognition. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Turvey, M. T. (1996). Dynamic touch. American Psychologist, 51(11), 1134–1152.
Ueno, Y., & Fujita, K. (1998). Spontaneous tool use by a Tonkean macaque (Macaca
tonkeana). Folia Primatologica, 69(5), 318–324.
Vaesen, K. (2012). The cognitive bases of human tool use. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 35(4), 203–218.
de Vignemont, F. (2010). Body schema and body image—pros and cons. Neuropsy-
chologia, 48(3), 669–680.
Visalberghi, E., Addessi, E., Truppa, V., Spagnoletti, N., Ottoni, E., Izar, P., et al.
(2009). Selection of effective stone tools by wild bearded capuchin monkeys.
Current Biology, 19(3), 213–217.
Wagman, J. B., & Carello, C. (2001). Affordances and inertial constraints on tool use.
Ecological Psychology, 13(3), 173–195.
Wolpert, D. M., Goodbody, S. J., & Husain, M. (1998). Maintaining internal
representations: The role of the human superior parietal lobe. Nature Neu-
roscience, 1(6), 529–533.
Wolpert, D. M., & Flanagan, J. R. (2010). Current Biology, 20(11), 467–472.
Yamamoto, S., & Kitazawa, S. (2001). Sensation at the tips of invisible tools. Nature
Neuroscience, 4(10), 979–980.
R.L. Rademaker et al. / Neuropsychologia 56 (2014) 196–203 203
